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Abstract
Financial markets are known for overreacting to public information. Central banks
can reduce this overreaction either by disclosing information to a fraction of market
participants only (partial publicity) or by disclosing information to all participants but
with ambiguity (partial transparency). We show that, in theory, both communication
strategies are strictly equivalent in the sense that overreaction can be indifferently
mitigated by reducing the degree of publicity or by reducing the degree of transparency.
We run a laboratory experiment to test whether theoretical predictions hold in a
game played by human beings. In line with theory, the experiment does not allow
the formulation of a clear preference in favor of either communication strategy. This
paper, however, makes a case for partial transparency rather than partial publicity
because the latter seems increasingly difficult to implement in the present information
age and is associated with discrimination as well as fairness issues.
JEL classification: C92, D82, D84, E58.
Keywords: heterogeneous information, public information, overreaction, transparency,
coordination, experiment.
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1 Introduction
Financial markets are known for overreacting to public information: press releases or pub-
lic speeches disclosed by influential economic actors, such as central banks, commonly
provoke large swings in market mood. Whereas the general presumption is that more
information improves the efficiency of the market outcome, recent literature argues that
disclosing public information can reduce its efficiency. Public disclosures are indeed detri-
mental to welfare if the market overreacts to inaccurate public information, as documented
by Morris and Shin (2002), or if public disclosures contain information that exacerbates
economic inefficiencies, as highlighted by Gai and Shin (2003), Angeletos and Pavan (2007)
or Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010).
Since central banks orchestrate the development of the financial system in present-day
economies, their disclosures usually attract the attention of the major market participants.
In an environment characterized by strategic complementarities, market participants react
to the disclosure of the central bank not solely because it contains valuable information
about economic fundamentals, but also because they know that other market participants
will react to the same disclosure as well. In the words of Morris and Shin (2002), public
information is a “double-edge instrument” as it is common knowledge1: it conveys valuable
information about economic fundamentals, but the desire to coordinate leads agents to
condition their actions to a stronger degree on public disclosures than is optimal from a
social perspective. In this context, the communication strategy of the central bank directly
influences economic efficiency as its public disclosures strongly shape market outcomes.
Because of the focal role of central banks’ disclosures, the issue of the communication
strategy of the central bank goes beyond the question of whether disclosing information
is desirable or not: it also deals with the question of how to disclose information in such
a way that the market does not excessively overreact to it. Controlling the degree of
market participants’ overreaction to its disclosures is an important and challenging task
for a central bank.
How can the central bank potentially reduce the overreaction to its disclosures? The
literature envisages two disclosure strategies for reducing the overreaction of market par-
ticipants to public information. The first – partial publicity – consists of disclosing trans-
parent public information to a fraction of market participants only (see Cornand and
Heinemann (2008)). Choosing a communication channel which does not reach all market
participants reduces overreaction to the disclosure as the uninformed participants can-
not react to it, whereas the informed participants react less strongly as they know that
some of their peers are uninformed. The second strategy – partial transparency – con-
sists of disclosing ambiguous public information to all market participants (see Heinemann
and Illing (2002) and Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010)). Communicating with ambiguity
reduces overreaction since ambiguity entails uncertainty about how other market partici-
pants interpret the disclosure, which mitigates its focal role. Of the two communication
1Common knowledge is knowledge that is known by everyone; everyone knows that everyone shares this
knowledge until an infinite degree of specularity.
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strategies, which one should the central bank prefer? More precisely, should the central
bank disclose clear information to a subgroup of market participants or should it disclose
ambiguous information to all participants?
The main purpose of this paper is to answer this question. First, it theoretically
analyses the effectiveness of partial publicity and partial transparency at reducing the
overreaction of market participants to public information. Second, it empirically tests
these theoretical predictions with a laboratory experiment. And third, it draws up policy
recommendations about strategies to disclose information to the public.
The theoretical analysis shows that partial publicity and partial transparency are
equivalent in reducing overreaction to public information and in improving welfare. The
degree of publicity is determined by the fraction of market participants who receive the
transparent public signal. The degree of transparency, however, is determined by the
idiosyncratic inaccuracy of the public signal disclosed to all market participants. Both
strategies are equivalent in the sense that overreaction can be indifferently mitigated ei-
ther by reducing the degree of publicity or by reducing the degree of transparency. More-
over, the optimal degree of publicity entails the same average weight assigned to public
disclosures (relative to private information) and the same welfare as the optimal degree
of transparency. There is an equivalence relationship between the fraction of informed
market participants capturing the degree of partial publicity and the variance of idiosyn-
cratic noise capturing the degree of partial transparency. Observing that both disclosure
strategies are theoretically equivalent, we run a laboratory experiment in order to check
whether theoretical predictions hold in a game involving human beings, and whether the
experiment indicates a preference for one or the other strategy.
The experiment is run with three informational treatments, each corresponding to a
disclosure strategy. The first treatment corresponds to the canonical model of Morris
and Shin (2002), where each subject receives a private and a public signal. The second
treatment implements the strategy of partial publicity, where only a subgroup of subjects
receives the public signal. The third treatment implements the strategy of partial trans-
parency, where each subject receives the public signal with an idiosyncratic noise. As
predicted by the model of Morris and Shin, the experiment exhibits subjects’ overreaction
to public information. The overreaction, however, is weaker than theoretically predicted
as in Cornand and Heinemann (2010), who relate this finding to subjects’ limited degree
of higher order beliefs and analyze the welfare effects of limited degree of reasoning when
agents receive both a public and a private signal.2 The present experiment also confirms
theoretical predictions which maintain that partial transparency and partial publicity are
equally effective at reducing the overreaction to public information: both strategies signif-
icantly limit overreaction, and to the extent that theory predicts, by limiting the degree
2In a speculative attack game close to Morris and Shin (2004), Cornand (2006) experimentally empha-
sizes the focal potential of public signals. Her framework, however, does not allow measuring subjects’
over-reaction to public information. In a paper based on Allen et al. (2006), Gao (2008) finds that public
information has a positive market efficiency effect due to the endogenous link between the informational
content role and the coordination role of public information and finds that transparency is welfare improv-
ing.
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of common knowledge in the lab. In line with theory, these findings suggest that human
beings react equally to a limited degree of publicity as to a limited degree of transparency.
Although neither the theory nor the experiment gives a clear preference in favor of
either disclosure strategy, this paper makes a case for partial transparency rather than
partial publicity for two reasons. First, partial transparency seems easier to implement
than partial publicity in our information age, where media quickly relay important in-
formation on a large scale. Second, partial publicity infringes upon equity and fairness
principles; a central bank may indeed find it politically untenable to intentionally with-
hold important information from a subgroup of the public. These findings suggest that
institutions, such as central banks, should control the overreaction to their public disclo-
sures by carefully formulating their content rather than by selecting their audience. Such
a statement rationalizes the mystic of central banks’ speeches.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and derives the equiv-
alence relationship between partial publicity and partial transparency. Section 3 develops
the experimental set-up. Section 4 gives the results of the experiment. Section 5 discusses
the policy recommendations we can draw from our study, and Section 6 concludes.
2 The theoretical model
This section presents the theoretical Keynesian ‘beauty contest’ formalized by Morris and
Shin (2002) (henceforth MS) and derives the optimal communication strategy for three
informational frameworks. First, the standard case of MS where each agent receives a
private and a public signal is discussed. Second, following Cornand and Heinemann (2008),
we consider the case of partial publicity (PP) where only a subgroup of agents receives
a public signal. And third, we analyze the case of partial transparency (PT) where each
agent receives a public signal with an idiosyncratic noise.
The economy is populated by a continuum of agents indexed by the unit interval [0, 1]
and by a central bank. The spirit of the Keynesian ‘beauty contest’ is characterized by
strategic complementarities in agents’ decision rule: each agent takes its decision not
only according to its expectation of economic fundamentals but also according to its
expectation of other agents’ decision. Generally, the optimal action of agent i under
strategic complementarities can be expressed as:
ai = (1− r)Ei(θ) + rEi(a¯),
where θ ∈ R is the fundamental, ai is the action taken by the agent i, a¯ is the average
action taken by all agents, and r is a constant. The parameter r is the weight assigned
to the strategic component which drives the strength of the coordination motive in the
decision rule. Assuming 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 implies that decisions are strategic complements:
agents tend to align their decision with those of others.
Such an optimal decision rule can be derived from various economic contexts. For
example, Amato et al. (2002), Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009), and Baeriswyl and Cornand
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(2010) interpret the ‘beauty contest’ as the price-setting rule of monopolistically com-
petitive firms; Angeletos and Pavan (2004) as the investment decision rule of competing
firms.
For the sake of generality, social welfare is assumed to decrease in both the dispersion
of actions across agents
∫
i(ai − a¯)2di and the distortion of the average action from the
fundamental (θ − a¯)2. The social loss function is given by:
L(a, θ) ≡
∫
i
(ai − a¯)2di+ λ(θ − a¯)2, (1)
where λ is the weight assigned to the economic distortion from the fundamental. The
welfare function used in the transparency debate of MS is a controversial matter because
the detrimental effect of transparency is driven by the relative weight of dispersion (coor-
dination) and distortion (stabilization) at the social level. The social loss function in the
form of (1) includes many welfare specifications. This social loss is reminiscent of the loss
of the representative household derived from a micro-founded monopolistic competitive
economy. The parameter λ can then accept a value consistent with the micro-foundation
of the model. However, the welfare in MS given by − ∫i(ai− θ)2di corresponds also to the
loss (1) with λ = 1, as shown in Baeriswyl (2011).
2.1 Private and public signals (MS)
The first considered informational framework corresponds to that of MS where each agent
i receives a private signal xi and a public signal y. These signals deviate from the funda-
mental θ by some error terms which are normally distributed. Whereas the private signal
xi = θ+ i with i ∼ N(0, σ2 ) is different for each agent i, the public signal y = θ+ η with
η ∼ N(0, σ2η) is the same for all agents. Noise terms i of distinct agents and the noise η of
the public signal are independent and their distribution is treated as exogenously given.
2.1.1 Equilibrium
To derive the perfect Bayesian equilibrium action of agents, we express the first-order
expectation of agent i about the fundamental θ conditional on its private and public
information:
E(θ|xi, y) =
σ2η
σ2 + σ
2
η
xi +
σ2
σ2 + σ
2
η
y (2)
The best estimate of the fundamental by agent i is an average of both its signals whose
weighting depend upon their relative precision.
As shown by MS, the optimal equilibrium action of agent i is a linear combination of
its private and public signals and can be expressed as:
ai = (1− w)xi + wy = (1− r)Ei(θ) + rEi(a¯)
4
= (1− r)
[ σ2η
σ2 + σ
2
η
xi +
σ2
σ2 + σ
2
η
y
]
+ r
[
(1− w)
[ σ2η
σ2 + σ
2
η
xi +
σ2
σ2 + σ
2
η
y
]
+ wy
]
=
(1− r)σ2η
σ2 + (1− r)σ2η︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−w
xi +
σ2
σ2 + (1− r)σ2η︸ ︷︷ ︸
w
y,
where Ei(·) is the posterior expectation conditional on xi and y. The average action over
all agents yields
a¯ =
(1− r)σ2η
σ2 + (1− r)σ2η︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−w
x¯+
σ2
σ2 + (1− r)σ2η︸ ︷︷ ︸
w
y, (3)
where x¯ =
∫
i xi = θ.
The weight attributed to the public signal in the equilibrium action w in (3) is larger
than in the best estimate of the fundamental θ given in (2). This discrepancy arises
because of the coordination motive in the optimal decision rule. Whereas i is an id-
iosyncratic noise, the noise η of the public signal is commonly observed by all agents and
the weight assigned to it increases as the coordination motive becomes stronger: strategic
complementarities raise the agents’ incentive to coordinate their actions around the public
signal. At the limit, when r converges to 1, equilibrium agents’ action is the public signal
itself, i.e. w = 1.
2.1.2 Expected welfare
Given the equilibrium action (3), the unconditional expected social loss can be written as
E(L) = E
(∫
i
(ai − a¯)2di+ λ(θ − a¯)2
)
= (1− w)2σ2 + λw2σ2η
=
(λσ2 + (1− r)2σ2η)σ2σ2η
(σ2 + (1− r)σ2η)2
. (4)
To illustrate the transparency debate of MS, let us assume that the public signal is
disclosed by the central bank and that it has the choice between disclosing this public
signal with precision σ2η (transparency) and withholding this signal (opacity). Under
which conditions would the central bank find it optimal to withhold its information? We
calculate the unconditional expected loss under opacity, and then compare this result with
the unconditional expected loss under transparency given in (4).
When the central bank withholds the public signal, agents’ action is merely given by
their private signal (i.e. w = 0) and the average action a¯ is equal to the fundamental
θ. The corresponding expected loss is then driven by the action dispersion across agents
and yields σ2 . It turns out that disclosing the public signal is preferable to withholding it
5
when
λ− 2(1− r) < σ
2

σ2η
. (5)
Disclosing the public signal is detrimental to welfare when it is too noisy relative to
the private signal, when the degree of strategic complementarities r is high, and when
the weight assigned to coordination is low (large λ). Our general loss function shows
the extent to which the welfare effect of transparency is related to the social value of
coordination. In the case of MS, as λ = 1, the private signal must be more accurate than
the public signal for transparency to be detrimental. This is why Svensson (2006) argues
that the detrimental effect of transparency emphasized in MS’s beauty-contest framework
arises under unrealistic conditions since the information held by public institutions such as
central banks is typically more accurate than the information that is privately available.
However, if the social value of coordination is smaller than in MS (i.e. λ > 1), opacity may
be preferable even when public information is more accurate than private information.
Moreover, even when transparency is preferable to opacity, reducing the degree of
common knowledge about the public signal may improve welfare. The degree of common
knowledge about public information can be reduced with two alternative communication
strategies. On the one hand, the degree of common knowledge is reduced by means of
partial publicity, that is by providing the public signal to a subgroup of agents only, as
proposed by Cornand and Heinemann (2008). On the other hand, the degree of common
knowledge is reduced by means of partial transparency, that is by providing the public
signal to all agents but with an idiosyncratic noise, which captures the ambiguity of central
bank’s disclosure.
2.2 Partial publicity (PP)
The second informational framework corresponds to that of Cornand and Heinemann
(2008) where each agent i receives a private signal xi and only a subgroup of agents
receives a public (or rather semi-public) signal y. Again, these signals deviate from the
fundamental θ by some error terms which are normally distributed. The private signal
xi = θ + i with i ∼ N(0, σ2 ) is different for each agent i. A proportion P of agents
receive a semi-public (common) signal y = θ + η with η ∼ N(0, σ2η). P is the degree of
publicity.
2.2.1 Equilibrium
To derive the optimal average action we treat separately the optimal action of the 1− P
agents who only get a private signal from the optimal action of the P agents who get both
a private and a semi-public signals. The optimal action of agents who get only the private
signal is simply given by its private signal:
ai,1−P = xi.
6
As the fundamental is improperly distributed, the optimal action for these agents is their
private signal itself.
The optimal equilibrium action of agents who get both the private and the semi-public
signal is a linear combination of their signals and is derived as
ai,P = (1− w)xi + wy = (1− r)Ei(θ) + r
[
(1− P )Ei(θ) + P ((1− w)Ei(θ) + wy)
]
=
(1− rP )σ2η
σ2 + (1− rP )σ2η︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−w
xi +
σ2
σ2 + (1− rP )σ2η︸ ︷︷ ︸
w
y. (6)
The weight attributed to the public signal by the fraction P of agents who observe it, w in
(6), is smaller than in the MS-treatment (3) if P < 1. Since agents know that a fraction
1 − P of them do not observe the public signal, they weight it less strongly as partial
publicity weakens its focal role.
The average action over both types of agents is given by
a¯ = (1− P )x¯1−P + P
[
(1− rP )σ2ηx¯P + σ2 y
σ2 + (1− rP )σ2η
]
=
(1− P )σ2 + (1− rP )σ2η
σ2 + (1− rP )σ2η︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−w¯
x¯+
Pσ2
σ2 + (1− rP )σ2η︸ ︷︷ ︸
w¯
y. (7)
The weight attributed to the public signal in the average equilibrium action w¯ = P ·w
in (7) is smaller than that in the MS-treatment given in (3) and increasing in P . This
means that reducing the degree of publicity by disclosing the semi-public signal only to a
subgroup of agents reduces the overreaction to the public signal.
2.2.2 Expected welfare
Given the equilibrium average action (7), the unconditional expected social loss can be
expressed as
E(L) = E
(∫
i
(ai − a¯)2di+ λ(θ − a¯)2
)
= E
(∫
P
((1− w)σ2 + (w − w¯)σ2η)2di+
∫
1−P
(σ2 − w¯σ2η)2di+ λ(w¯σ2η)2
)
=
[
P (1− w)2 + 1− P
]
σ2 +
[
P (1− P + λP )w2
]
σ2η
=
σ2 ((σ
2
 + (1− rP )σ2η)2 + σ2P (σ2η(2rP + λP − P − 1)− σ2 ))
(σ2 + (1− rP )σ2η)2
(8)
To determine the optimal degree of publicity P ∗, we minimize the loss (8) with respect
to P :
∂L
∂P
= 0 ⇔ P ∗ = σ
2
 + σ
2
η
(2λ− 2 + 3r)σ2η
.
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Since 0 ≤ P ≤ 1, the optimal degree of publicity is expressed as
P ∗ = min
[
max
(
0,
σ2 + σ
2
η
(2λ− 2 + 3r)σ2η
)
, 1
]
(9)
and plugging it into the unconditional expected loss (8) delivers the optimal expected loss
E(L∗) = σ2 +
σ4
4σ2η(1− r − λ)
. (10)
2.3 Partial transparency (PT)
The third informational framework corresponds to the case where each agent i receives a
private signal xi and a public (or rather semi-public) signal with an idiosyncratic noise
yi. These signals deviate from the fundamental θ by some error terms which are normally
distributed. The private signal is given by xi = θ+ i with i ∼ N(0, σ2 ). The semi-public
signal is defined as yi = θ + η + φi with η ∼ N(0, σ2η) and φi ∼ N(0, σ2φ). The signal yi is
semi-public in the sense that it contains an error term η that is common to all agents and
an error term φi that is private to each agent i.
2.3.1 Equilibrium
To derive the perfect Bayesian equilibrium action of agents, we express the first-order
expectation of agent i about the fundamental θ and the average semi-public signal y¯
observed by other agents conditional on its private and semi-public information:
E(θ|xi, yi) =
σ2η + σ
2
φ
σ2 + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
xi +
σ2
σ2 + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
yi
E(y¯|xi, yi) =
σ2φ
σ2 + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
xi +
σ2 + σ
2
η
σ2 + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
yi.
The best estimate of the fundamental by agent i is an average of both its signals whose
weighting depends upon their relative precision.
The optimal equilibrium action of agent i is a linear combination of its private and
semi-public signals and can be expressed as:
ai = (1− w)xi + wyi = (1− r)Ei(θ) + rEi(a¯)
= (1− r)
[(σ2η + σ2φ)xi + σ2 yi
σ2 + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
]
+ r
[
(1− w)
[(σ2η + σ2φ)xi + σ2 yi
σ2 + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
]
+ w
σ2φxi + (σ
2
 + σ
2
η)yi
σ2 + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
]
=
(1− r)σ2η + σ2φ
σ2 + (1− r)σ2η + σ2φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−w
xi +
σ2
σ2 + (1− r)σ2η + σ2φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
w
yi.
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The average action over all agents yields
a¯ =
(1− r)σ2η + σ2φ
σ2 + (1− r)σ2η + σ2φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−w
x¯+
σ2
σ2 + (1− r)σ2η + σ2φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
w
y¯. (11)
The weight attributed to the semi-public signal in the average equilibrium action w in
(11) is smaller than that in the MS-treatment given in (3) and is decreasing in σ2φ. This
indicates that reducing the degree of transparency by disclosing the public signal with an
idiosyncratic noise to each agent reduces the overreaction to the public signal.
2.3.2 Expected welfare
Given the equilibrium average action (11), the unconditional expected social loss can be
expressed as
E(L) = E
(∫
i
(ai − a¯)2di+ λ(θ − a¯)2
)
= (1− w)2σ2 + w2σ2φ + λw2σ2η
=
σ2 ((r − 1)2σ4η + σ2φ(σ2 + σ2φ) + σ2η(λσ2 − 2(r − 1)σ2φ))
(σ2 + (1− r)σ2η + σ2φ)2
(12)
To determine the optimal degree of transparency σ2∗φ , we minimize the loss (12) with
respect to σ2φ:
∂L
∂σ2φ
= 0 ⇔ σ2φ = (2λ− 3(1− r))σ2η − σ2 .
Since σ2φ > 0, the optimal degree of publicity is expressed as
σ2∗φ = max
[
0, (2λ− 3(1− r))σ2η − σ2
]
(13)
and plugging it into the unconditional expected loss (12) delivers the optimal expected
loss
E(L∗) = σ2 +
σ4
4σ2η(1− r − λ)
. (14)
2.4 Equivalence between partial publicity and partial transparency
The overreaction to the public signal that arises in an environment of strategic comple-
mentarities can be reduced by two alternative communication strategies, namely partial
publicity (PP) and partial transparency (PT). We show in this section that both commu-
nication strategies are equivalent for reducing overreaction in the sense that (i) the weight
assigned to the public signal can be equivalently controlled by means of PP or PT, (ii)
the optimal weight assigned to the public signal is the same under PP as under PT, and
9
(iii) for any given weight assigned to the public signal the expected welfare is the same in
PP as in PT.
First, the weight assigned to the public signal can be equivalently controlled by means
of PP or PT, and there is a clear relationship between the degree of publicity P and the
degree of transparency σ2φ for implementing a given weight on the public signal. To show
this relation, we compare the weight in PP given in (7) to that in PT given in (11)
Pσ2
σ2 + (1− rP )σ2η
=
σ2
σ2 + (1− r)σ2η + σ2φ
and solve it for P and for σ2φ
P =
σ2 + σ
2
η
σ2 + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
(15)
σ2φ =
1− P
P
(σ2 + σ
2
η). (16)
This relation illustrates how partial publicity can be translated into partial transparency
for reducing overreaction.
Second, the optimal degree of publicity is equivalent to the optimal degree of trans-
parency in the sense that both deliver the same average weight on the public (or semi-
public) signal. Plugging (15) into (9) yields the optimal degree of transparency (13), or
plugging (16) into (13) delivers the optimal degree of publicity (9).
Third, it is also straightforward to show that the unconditional expected loss under
PP (8) is equal to the unconditional expected loss under PT (12) when (15) or (16) holds.
This implies that the expected loss is the same in both models not only at the optimal
degree of publicity or transparency as expressed in (10) and (14) but for any weight on
public information.
Figure 1 highlights the welfare effect of reducing the degree of common knowledge
and the equivalence relationship between partial publicity and partial transparency. The
upper panel shows the unconditional expected loss under full transparency (dotted line),
under full opacity (dashed line), and under optimal partial publicity or transparency (solid
line). The optimal degree of publicity P ∗ and the optimal degree of transparency σ2∗φ are
represented in the lower panel. The parameter values are r = 0.9, λ = 1 (as in MS),
and σ2η = 0.25. Comparing the uncondition expected loss under full opacity and full
transparency illustrates the debate in the vein of MS. According to condition (5), full
opacity is preferable to full transparency if private information is relatively accurate, i.e.
if σ2 < 0.2.
However, the spirit of MS survives the critique of Svensson (2006) once we allow for
partial levels of publicity or transparency. Reducing the degree of publicity or transparency
improves indeed welfare compared to the full transparency case even if public information
is more accurate than private information, i.e. σ2η = 0.25 < σ
2
 < 0.425. For larger
inaccuracy of private information, i.e. σ2 > 0.425, reducing the degree of publicity or
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Figure 1: Unconditional expected loss and optimal degree of publicity vs. transparency
transparency is not optimal anymore and P ∗ = 1, σ2∗φ = 0 as shown in the lower panel.
3 The experiment
The previous section shows that, in theory, overreaction to public information can be
indifferently mitigated by reducing the degree of publicity or the degree of transparency
of the public signal. One may question whether this theoretical equivalence also holds
in practice, when homos sapiens sapiens are involved in the ‘beauty contest’ instead of
homos oeconomicus. A natural way to test this issue is to run a laboratory experiment
which implements the alternative disclosure strategies, as real data may be difficult to
collect. The theoretical model in Section 2 is adjusted to an experimental framework, as
presented in Appendix A. The model is modified in two respects. First, the number of
subjects is finite (instead of a continuum of agents) and second, the distribution of error
terms is uniform (instead of normal).
We run an experiment with three treatments, each corresponding to a disclosure strat-
egy. In the MS-treatment (Morris and Shin (2002)), derived in Sections 2.1 and A.1, each
subject receives a private and a public signal. In the PP-treatment (partial publicity a` la
Cornand and Heinemann (2008)), derived in Sections 2.2 and A.2, each subject receives a
private signal and a subgroup of subjects receives a semi-public signal. Finally, in the PT-
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treatment (partial transparency), derived in Sections 2.3 and A.3, each subject receives a
private signal and a semi-public signal, which contains both a public error term that is
common to all subjects and an idiosyncratic error term that is private to each subject.
The experiment is calibrated in such a way that the equilibrium weight assigned to the
semi-public signal in the PP-treatment is equal to that in the PT-treatment.
We discuss in this section the general development of the experiment, the chosen
parameters for each treatment, and the corresponding theoretical behavior.
3.1 Experimental development
Sessions were run at the LEES (Laboratoire d’Economie Expe´rimentale de Strasbourg),
which is part of the BETA (Bureau d’Economie The´orique et Applique´e) laboratory in
Strasbourg in January 2011. Each session had 14 participants who were mainly students
from Strasbourg University (most were students in economics, mathematics, biology and
psychology). Subjects were seated in random order at PCs. Instructions were then read
aloud and questions answered in private. Throughout the sessions, students were not
allowed to communicate with one another and could not see each others’ screens. Each
subject could only participate in one session. Before starting the experiment, subjects
were required to answer a few questions to ascertain their understanding of the rules.
Examples of instructions and questionnaires are given in the Appendix. The experiment
started after all subjects had given the correct answers to these questions. We conducted
9 sessions with a total of 126 subjects. In each session, the 14 participants were separated
into two independent groups (in order to get 2 observations per session and 18 observations
in total). Each session consisted of three stages (to be declined in different treatments) and
each stage of 15 periods (total of 45 periods per session). Each stage contained a different
treatment. In each period, subjects played within the same group so that there was no
re-matching during the whole experiment (subjects played with the same participants of
the same group throughout the experiment). Subjects did not know the identity of the
other subjects of their group.
In every period and for each group, a fundamental state θ is drawn randomly using a
uniform distribution from the interval [50, 950]. In every period of the experiment, each
subject has to decide on an action ai, conditional on her signals. The payoff function in
ECU (experimental currency units) for subject i is given by the formulas: 400− 1.5(ai −
θ)2 − 8.5(ai − a¯)2, where a¯ is the average action of other subjects of the same group.3 To
decide on an action, subjects receive some signals on the fundamental θ and are forced to
choose as action a weighted average of the signals they get.4
After each period, subjects were informed about the true state, their partner’s decision
and their payoff. Information about past periods from the same stage (including signals
and own decisions) was displayed during the decision phase on the lower part of the screen.
3In sessions 7 to 9, the payoff function is adjusted to 450− 1.5(ai − θ)2 − 8.5(ai − a¯)2 for the expected
payoff to be constant across sessions.
4Concretely, subjects move a cursor inside the interval defined by their signals to determine their chosen
action. By doing so, we restrain subjects from choosing actions outside of their signal interval.
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At the end of each session, the ECU earned were summed up and converted into euros.
1000 ECU were converted to 2 euros.5 Payoffs ranged from 8 to 28 euros. The average
payoff was about 20 euros. Sessions lasted for around 60 minutes.
3.2 Parameters
The parameters choice for the experiment is summarized in Table 1.
Sessions Groups Players Stage Treatment Periods r  η φ p
Sessions 1-3 1-6 7 1 MS 15 0.85 10 10 0 7
2 PP 15 0.85 10 10 0 5
3 PT 15 0.85 10 10 8.5 7
Sessions 4-6 7-12 7 1 MS 15 0.85 10 10 0 7
2 PT 15 0.85 10 10 8.5 7
3 PP 15 0.85 10 10 0 5
Sessions 7-9 13-18 7 1 MS 15 0.85 10 15 0 7
2 PP 15 0.85 10 15 0 5
3 PT 15 0.85 10 15 11 7
Table 1: Experiment parameters
In the MS-treatment, each subject receives both a public and a private signal as de-
scribed in Section A.1. The private signal received by each subject is distributed as
xi ∈ [θ − 10, θ + 10]. The distribution of the additional public signal differs depending on
the session. In sessions 1 to 6, each group of subjects receives a common (public) signal
y ∈ [θ − 10, θ + 10]. In sessions 7 to 9, each group of subjects receives a common (public)
signal y ∈ [θ − 15, θ + 15].
In the PP-treatment, whereas each subject receives a private signal, only a subgroup
of subjects receives a semi-public signal as described in Section A.2. The private signal
received by each subject is uniformly drawn from xi ∈ [θ − 10, θ + 10]. In addition, 5 out
7 subjects in the group receive a common (semi-public) signal whose distribution depends
on the session. In sessions 1 to 6, each subgroup of 5 subjects receives a common (public)
signal uniformly drawn from y ∈ [θ − 10, θ + 10]. In sessions 7 to 9, each subgroup of 5
subjects receives a common (public) signal uniformly drawn from y ∈ [θ− 15, θ+ 15]. The
2 subjects who do not receive the semi-public signal (but only their private signal) are
drawn randomly and independently each period.
In the PT-treatment, each subject receives a private signal and a semi-public signal
as described in Section A.3. The private signal received by each subject is uniformly
drawn from xi ∈ [θ − 10, θ + 10]. In addition, each subject in the group receives a semi-
public signal that contains both a public (common to the whole group) and a private
noise. In sessions 1 to 6, each subject receives a semi-public signal uniformly drawn from
5In all stages, it was possible to earn negative points. Realized losses were of a size that could be
counterbalanced by positive payoffs within a few periods. In total, no subject earned a negative payoff in
any session.
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yi ∈ [y − 8.5, y + 8.5] with y ∈ [θ − 10, θ + 10]. In sessions 7 to 9, each subject receives a
semi-public signal uniformly drawn from yi ∈ [y − 11, y + 11] with y ∈ [θ − 15, θ + 15].
As reported in Table 1, the order of play is different in the first group of sessions (1
to 3) from that of the second group of sessions (4 to 6). This change in order aims at
testing order effects (MS, PP, PT versus MS, PT, PP). The change in the precision of the
public signal in the third group of sessions (7 to 9) compared to the first two groups aims
at testing comparative statics effects in terms of public signal’s relative precision.
3.3 Equilibrium weights and expected payoff under rational behavior
Reducing the degree of publicity or the degree of transparency aims at mitigating the
overreaction to the public signal that would occur in the MS-treatment, where signals
are either purely private or purely public. The parameters presented above are chosen
in such a way that the equilibrium weight assigned to the semi-public signal in PP- and
PT-treatment coincides with the weight assigned to the public signal in the first-order
expectation of the fundamental θ in the MS-treatment. This corresponds to the case
where the communication strategy aims at avoiding the overreaction to public disclosure
compared to the case of a purely public signal.
The equilibrium weights on y are reported in Table 2. Column Ei(θ) shows the weight
assigned to the public or semi-public signal in the first-order expectation of the fundamen-
tal θ, column w shows the equilibrium weight in the rational behavior for subjects who
get the public or semi-public signal, and column w¯ shows the equilibrium weight in the
rational behavior over all subjects.
Table 2 also reports the expected payoff in ECU under rational behavior. Column
u(1-P) shows the expected payoff for subjects in the PP-treatment who do not get the
semi-public signal. Their expected payoff is naturally lower than that of subjects who
get the semi-public signal u(P). The overall expected payoff is reported in column u. For
sessions 1 to 6, the expected gain with rational behavior over the whole experiment is
(356.5 + 227.3 + 244.0) ∗ 15/500 = 25, while for sessions 7 to 9, the expected gain is
(363.8 + 223.3 + 246.3) ∗ 15/500 = 25.
Treat. r  η φ p Ei(θ) w w¯ u(1-P) u(P) u
MS 0.85 10 10 0 7 0.5 0.8696 0.8696 356.5 356.5
MS 0.85 10 15 0 7 0.4 0.8163 0.8163 363.8 363.8
PP 0.85 10 10 0 5 0.5 0.6977 0.4983 -29.1 329.9 227.3
PP 0.85 10 15 0 5 0.4 0.6061 0.4329 -45.9 330.9 223.3
PT 0.85 10 10 8.5 7 0.3509 0.5 0.5 244.0 244.0
PT 0.85 10 15 11 7 0.2777 0.4301 0.4301 246.3 246.3
Table 2: Equilibrium weights on the public signal Y and expected payoff under rational
behavior
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4 The results
This section presents the results of the experiment. We first describe the data and then an-
alyze them by confronting observed weights to theoretical weights, analyzing overreaction
effects, comparing weights in different treatments (MS - PP - PT), looking at order ef-
fects, and comparative statics effects in terms of relative precision.6 We use non-parametric
statistics to test our hypotheses.7
4.1 Data description
Table 3 presents the average action within a group of participants captured by the ob-
served weight on the public signal for each treatment calculated as the group average of
|Decisioni−xi|
|y−xi| . A value of one indicates that agents have taken a decision equal to the public
signal y, while a value of zero indicates that agents have taken a decision equal to their
private signal. We also recall the corresponding theoretical values.
Session Group MS PP PT
1 1 .6278 .4456 .5089
1 2 .7012 .4976 .4208
2 3 .8089 .5934 .5225
2 4 .6355 .4926 .5306
3 5 .7484 .4705 .5700
3 6 .6526 .4586 .4772
4 7 .6167 .4595 .4896
4 8 .7244 .4770 .4595
5 9 .7071 .4106 .5205
5 10 .6530 .4568 .5312
6 11 .6319 .4944 .5662
6 12 .7085 .5273 .4282
Average groups 1-12 .6846 .4819 .5021
Theory groups 1-12 .8696 .4983 .5000
7 13 .7979 .5122 .4746
7 14 .6972 .4630 .4166
8 15 .7706 .5507 .5036
8 16 .6749 .4884 .4929
9 17 .7849 .4910 .4737
9 18 .7276 .4857 .4733
Average groups 13-18 .7422 .4985 .4724
Theory groups 13-18 .8163 .4329 .4301
Table 3: Observed and theoretical average weights on the public signal
The evolution of the average weight assigned to the public signal over the 15 periods
6We also test for convergence effects by comparing the average weights on the public signal of the
first half of periods to the second half of periods for each treatment but cannot find any difference in the
samples.
7Systematic test results are available by the authors upon request.
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Figure 2: Average weight assigned to the public signal: groups 1-12 (lhs) and groups 13-18
(rhs)
of each treatment is illustrated on Figure 2 for groups 1 to 12 (where private and public
signals have the same accuracy) and for groups 13 to 18 (where private signals are more
accurate). It is obvious at first glance that the weight assigned to the public signal is
much larger in the MS-treatment than in the PP- or PT-treatments. Figure 3 illustrates
the evolution over the periods of the average weight on the public signal for each group.
4.2 Experiment and theory
We first analyze whether the observed average weight assigned to the public signal in the
experiment is significantly different from the weight derived in the theory. We define the
null hypothesis H01-T-G as follows:
H01-T-G The observed weight assigned to the public signal by groups G in
treatment T is not different from the equilibrium theoretical weight of treat-
ment T.
We test the null hypothesis H01-T-G for each treatment T (MS - PP - PT) owing to
a Wilcoxon matched pairs signed rank test.8 For the MS-treatment, the weight observed
in the experiment is significantly lower than its theoretical value (for both groups 1-12
and 13-18). Test results reject H01-MS-1-12 (Null hypothesis H01, treatment MS, groups
1 to 12) (p-value: p = 0.000) and H01-MS-13-18 (p ≤ 0.031). For the PP-treatment, the
result depends on the groups considered. Whereas the weight observed in the experiment
does no significantly differ from its theoretical value for groups 1-12, it is significantly
larger than its theoretical value for groups 13-18. Test results do not reject H01-PP-1-12
(p ≤ 0.109), but reject H01-PP-13-18 (p ≤ 0.031). Overall, H01-PP-(1-18) is not rejected
(p ≤ 0.495). For the PT-treatment, there is no significant difference between the weight
8The Wilcoxon matched pairs signed rank test is used to determine the magnitude of difference between
matched groups. This test can be used for comparing estimates with fixed values.
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Figure 3: Average weight assigned to the public signal for each group
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observed in the experiment and its theoretical value. Test results do not reject H01-PT-
1-12 (p ≤ 0.969) and H01-PT-13-18 (p ≤ 0.062). Although the hypothesis H01-PT-13-18
cannot be rejected at the 5% confidence level, the weight observed in the experiment
tends to be larger than its theoretical value in groups 13-18, which is also true for the
PP-treatment H01-PP-13-18.
We can thus state our first result:
Result H01-MS For the MS-treatment, the weight assigned to the public
signal in the experiment is significantly lower than its theoretical value.
Result H01-PP For the PP-treatment, the weight assigned to the semi-public
signal in the experiment does not significantly differ from its theoretical value
when the private signal is as accurate as the semi-public signal (groups 1 to
12), but is significantly larger than its theoretical value when the private signal
is more accurate than the semi-public signal (groups 13 to 18).
Result H01-PT For the PT-treatment, the weight assigned to the semi-public
signal in the experiment does not significantly differ from its theoretical value
at the 5% confidence level when the private signal is either as accurate as
or more accurate than the average semi-public signal. However, at the 10%
confidence level, the weight assigned to the semi-public signal in the experiment
is significantly larger than its theoretical value when the private signal is more
accurate than the average semi-public signal (groups 13 to 18).
4.3 Overreaction
Although the previous analysis suggests that subjects do not respond to the public signal
as strongly as theory predicts in the MS-treatment, they may still overreact to the public
signal if the weight they assign to it is larger than the weight justified by its face value, i.e.
by the first-order expectation of the fundamental. To analyze whether there is overreaction
in the sense of Morris and Shin (2002), we test the following null hypothesis:
H02-T-G The observed weight assigned to the public signal by groups G
in treatment T is not different from the theoretical weight in the first-order
expectation of the fundamental.
We test the null hypothesis H02-T-G for each treatment T owing to a Wilcoxon
matched pairs signed rank test. All tests (for all treatments and all groups) exhibit a
significantly larger weight on the public signal in experimental data compared to that in
the first order expectation of the fundamental. Test results show that we can reject H02-
MS-1-12 (p = 0.000), H02-MS-13-18 (p ≤ 0.031), H02-PP-1-12 (p = 0.000), H02-PP-13-18
(p ≤ 0.031), H02-PT-1-12 (p = 0.000) and H02-PT-13-18 (p ≤ 0.031)). We can therefore
state our second result:
Result H02 For all treatments, the weight assigned to the public signal is
significantly larger than the theoretical weight in the first-order expectation of
the fundamental. Subjects do overreact to the public or semi-public signal.
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From results H01 et H02, we can deduce that although subjects do overreact in all
treatments, they overreact less than theory predicts in the MS-treatment. One reason
may be that, contrary to theoretical agents, experimental subjects have limited levels of
reasoning (see Cornand and Heinemann (2010) for more details and section 4.7 below).
This observation is no more true for the PP- and PT-treatments. Whereas the weight
assigned to the semi-public signal is not significantly different from its theoretical value
when the private signal is as accurate as the (average) semi-public signal, it tends to be
larger than its theoretical value when the private signal is more accurate than the (average)
semi-public signal.
4.4 Treatment comparison
As derived in Sections 2.4 and A.4, the PP- and PT-treatments are equivalent in theory
for reducing the overreaction to the public signal (relative to the MS-treatment) and are
calibrated in the experiment such that they induce the same behavior of subjects. To test
whether the alternative treatments induce the same behavior in the experiment, we state
the following hypothesis:
H03-T1-T2-G The observed weight assigned to the public signal by group G
in treatment T1 is not different from the weight in treatment T2.
We compare observed data of the MS-, PP-, and PT-treatments with each other owing
to a Student-t test9 and a Wilcoxon test. We observe a significant difference between
MS and PP on the one hand, and MS and PT on the other hand. Indeed, test results
indicate that we can reject H03-MS-PP-1-12, H03-MS-PP-13-18 and H03-MS-PT-1-12,
H03-MS-PT-13-18 (p = 0.000 for both the Student t-test and the Wilcoxon test for each
hypothesis). By contrast, there is no significant difference between PP and PT for groups
1 to 12: we cannot reject H03-PP-PT-1-12 (p ≤ 0.348 for the Student t-test and p ≤ 0.339
for the Wilcoxon test). However, the result is more ambiguous for groups 13 to 18 as
H03-PP-PT-13-18 can be rejected according to the Student t-test (p ≤ 0.040) and but
not according to the Wilcoxon test (p ≤ 0.062), indicating that the weight assigned to
the semi-public signal tends to be larger in the PP- than in the PT-treatment when the
private signal is more accurate than the (average) semi-public signal. Overall (taking all
groups together), we cannot reject H03-PP-PT-1-18 (p ≤ 0.743 for the Student t-test and
p ≤ 0.766 for the Wilcoxon test). We can thus state our third result:
Result H03-MS-PP and H03-MS-PT The weight assigned to the pub-
lic signal is significantly larger in the MS-treatment than in the PP- or PT-
treatment.
Result H03-PP-PT Whereas the weight assigned to the semi-public signal
is not significantly different in the PP- and PT-treatments when the private
signal is as accurate as the (average) semi-public signal (groups 1 to 12), the
9This test is appropriate to compare data from different treatments.
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weight tends to be larger in the PP- than in the PT-treatment when the pri-
vate signal is more accurate than the (average) semi-public signal (groups 13
to 18).
Comparing the hypothesis H01 to H03, results can be summarized as follows. When
the private signal is as accurate as the (average) semi-public signal (groups 1 to 12), the
PP- and PT-treatments do not significantly differ from the theoretical predictions as shown
in H01 and do not significantly differ from each other as shown in H03. On the contrary,
when the private signal is more accurate than the (average) semi-public signal (groups 13
to 18), the weight assigned to the semi-public signal in the PP- and PT- treatments tends
to be significantly larger than its theoretical value and the weight tends to be larger in
the PP- than in the PT-treatment.
4.5 Treatment order
Although the weight assigned to the semi-public signal is not significantly different in
the PP- and PT-treatments when the private signal is as accurate as the (average) semi-
public signal (groups 1 to 12), the weight may differ depending on whether the PP- or the
PT-treatment is played directly after the MS-treatment in the experiment. To establish
whether there are effects from treatment order, we formulate the null hypothesis:
H04-T The observed weight assigned to the semi-public signal in treatment
T is not influenced by the treatment order.
We compare the observed weight in either the PP- or the PT-treatment in groups where
the PP-treatment is played before the PT-treatment (groups 1 to 6) to the observed weight
in groups where treatments are played in reversed order (groups 7 to 12). Student-t tests
do not show any order effect on subjects’ behavior. First, comparing the behavior in the
PP-treatment in groups 1 to 6 with that in groups 7 to 12 shows that the hypothesis
H04-PP cannot be rejected (p ≤ 0.432). Second, the same is true for the PT-treatment in
groups 1 to 6 compared with groups 7 to 12. The hypothesis H04-PT cannot be rejected
(p ≤ 0.847). Third, one can also test the order effect by comparing the weight difference
in the PP- and PT-treatments in groups 1 to 6 with the weight difference in groups 7 to
12. The hypothesis H04-PP-PT cannot be rejected (p ≤ 0.3773). This allow us to state
our fourth result:
Result H04 The weight assigned to the semi-public signal is not significantly
influenced by the order of treatment in the experiment.
4.6 Comparative statics
Our experimental design allows to test the effect of the relative precision of public and
private signals on subjects’ behavior. Whereas the private and the public signals have the
same precision for groups 1 to 12, the private signal is more accurate than the public one
for groups 13 to 18. To test the effect of relative precision, we define the null hypothesis:
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H05-T The observed weight assigned to the public signal in treatment T is
not influenced by the relative precision of the public signal.
We compare the weight assigned to the public signal in groups 1 to 6 with groups 13
to 18, owing to a Student-t test for each treatment.10 Hypotheses H05-MS, H05-PP and
H05-PT cannot be rejected (p ≤ 0.2229, p ≤ 0.8302 and p ≤ 0.2089 respectively).
This allow us to state our fifth result:
Result H05 The weight assigned to the public signal is not significantly in-
fluenced by the relative precision of private and public signals.
Although there is no apparent effect of the relative precision on the weight assigned
to the public signal11, we can nevertheless notice that, as shown in H03-PP-PT of Section
4.4, the weight tends to be larger in the PP- than in the PT-treatment when the private
signal is more accurate than the semi-public signal. Indeed, it seems that when the private
signal is more accurate, the PT-treatment is more successful than the PP-treatment to
reduce the overreaction.
4.7 Limited levels of reasoning
It is intriguing that subjects’ behavior is significantly different from the equilibrium in the
MS-treatment but not in the PP- and PT-treatments (see 4.2). This suggests that, given
the degree of publicity and transparency of their signals, subjects attach less importance
to the coordination motive in the MS-treatment than in the PP- and PT-treatments.
In other words, subjects seem to operate different levels of reasoning when playing the
MS-treatment or the PP- and PT-treatments. The importance attached to the coordi-
nation motive can be measured with the number of reasoning (iteration) about common
knowledge information that subjects operate when they make their decision.
The level-1 of reasoning is defined as the best response of subject i if he ignores the
coordination motive in the payoff function, which corresponds to the first-order expectation
Ei(θ). The level-2 of reasoning is defined as the best response of subject i if he assumes
that other agents play according to the level-1 of reasoning. And so on. Generally, the
level-k of reasoning is defined as the best response of subject i if he assumes that other
agents play according to the level-k−1 of reasoning. The equilibrium behavior corresponds
to the case where all subjects operate an infinite number of reasoning.
Appendix B derives the equilibrium weight assigned to the public signal for limited
degree of reasoning. Table 4 below provides a summary statistics of theoretical weights
on y according to treatments and levels of reasoning. We formulate the null hypothesis:
10Although this is one of the main feature of the theoretical literature on global games and coordination
games under heterogeneous information, this hypothesis has never been experimentally tested.
11Note that our design may not be appropriate to test the comparative statics effect in the relative
precision as the chosen value of r is high. Maybe, with lower r some effects could be detected. Another
reason why we could not detect any comparative statics effect may be that the change in relative precision
was done from one session to the next and not within a session.
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H06-T-G-Lx The observed weight assigned to the public signal by groups
G in treatment T is not different from the theoretical weight for level-x of
reasoning in treatment T.
Table 5 reports the results of Wilcoxon matched pairs signed rank tests of the hypoth-
esis H06 for each treatment and each level of reasoning.12
Treatment MS PP PT
Groups 1-12 13-18 1-12 13-18 1-12 13-18
Level-1 .5000 .4000 .3571 .2857 .3509 .2778
Level-2 .7125 .6040 .4583 .3829 .4555 .3762
Level-3 .8028 .7080 .4870 .4159 .4867 .4110
Level-4 .8412 .7611 .4951 .4271 .4960 .4233
Level-5 .8575 .7882 .4974 .4309 .4988 .4277
Level-6 .8644 .8020 .4981 .4322 .4996 .4293
Level-∞ (equilibrium) .8696 .8163 .4983 .4329 .5000 .4301
Observed weight .6846 .7422 .4819 .4985 .5021 .4724
Table 4: Theoretical average weights on the public signal according to treatments and
levels of reasoning
Treatment MS PP PT
Groups 1-12 13-18 1-12 13-18 1-12 13-18
Level-1 reject reject reject reject reject reject
p-value .000 .031 .000 .031 .000 .031
Level-2 accept reject accept reject reject reject
p-value .176 .031 .110 .031 .012 .031
Level-3 reject accept accept reject accept reject
p-value .001 .219 .424 .031 .301 .031
Level-4 reject accept accept reject accept accept
p-value .000 .563 .151 .031 .677 .063
Level-5 reject accept accept reject accept accept
p-value .000 .094 .129 .031 .733 .063
Level-6 reject reject accept reject accept accept
p-value .000 .031 .110 .031 .910 .063
Level-∞ reject reject accept reject accept accept
p-value .000 .031 .110 .031 .970 .063
Table 5: Hypothesis tests: the observed weight in the experiment is not different from the
theoretical weight at specific levels of reasoning
As noted in result H01-MS in Section 4.2, for the MS-treatment, there is a significant
difference between the equilibrium and observed data. This difference may be explained
by limited levels of reasoning. For groups 1-12, we observe that subjects play on average
12As we test the hypothesis H06 with the observed weights averaged over subjects of a group and over
periods, the level of reasoning tested does not correspond to the average level of reasoning over subjects
but to the level of reasoning of the average subject.
22
strategies between level-1 and level-2 in the MS-treatment. Test results do not reject
H06-MS-1-12-L2 (the theoretical weight in level-2 of reasoning is not significantly different
from the weight observed in the experiment). This finding is in line with Cornand and
Heinemann (2010) although with a slightly different design. However for groups 13-18,
subjects seemed to have higher levels of reasoning, with an average located between level-3
and level-4. Test results do not reject H06-MS-13-18-L3, H06-MS-13-18-L4, and H06-MS-
13-18-L5. These levels of reasoning rather coincide with the findings of Nagel (1995) who
considers a different, pure beauty contest, game. The fact that, as stated in our result H05,
the weight is not significantly influenced by the relative precision of private and public
signals is reflected by the higher level of reasoning in groups 13 to 18 than in groups 1 to
12.13
For the PP-treatment, subjects play in groups 1 to 12 on average strategies between
level-2 and level-3 of reasoning. The hypothesis H06-PP-1-12 however cannot be rejected
for level-2 of reasoning and higher. In groups 13 to 18, the observed weight is significantly
larger than the equilibrium weight (level-∞ of reasoning) as stated in result H01-PP and
the hypothesis H06-PP-13-18 is rejected for each level of reasoning.
For the PT-treatment, the weight observed in groups 1 to 12 and 13 to 18 is, on average,
larger than the equilibrium weight implied by the level-∞ of reasoning. The hypothesis
H06-PT-1-12 however cannot be rejected for level-3 of reasoning and higher, whereas the
hypothesis H06-PT-13-18 cannot be rejected for level-4 of reasoning and higher.
Overall, we observe that subjects operate different levels of reasoning depending on
the treatment. The fact that the level of reasoning in the MS-treatment tends to be
lower than in the PP- and PT-treatments suggests that subjects tend to underestimate
the de-coordination effect (the reduction in overreaction to public information) induced
by limiting the degree of publicity or transparency. In other words, if subjects would
operate the same level of reasoning in the PP- and PT-treatments as in the MS-treatment,
reducing the degree of publicity or transparency would even more effectively mitigate the
overreaction to public signal than it is observed in the experiment.
5 Policy recommendations
While practitioners in central banks agree on the desirability of informative announcements
and promote higher transparency on the grounds that any information is valuable to
markets,14 public announcements may, at the same time, destabilize markets by generating
overreaction, as highlighted by Morris and Shin (2002). Since public announcements serve
as focal points for market participants in predicting others’ beliefs, they affect agents’
13See also Shapiro et al. (2009) who analyze the predictive power of level-k reasoning in a game that
combines features of Morris and Shin (2002) with the guessing game of Nagel (1995). They try to identify
whether individual strategies are consistent with level-k reasoning. They argue that the predictive power
of level-k reasoning is positively related to the strength of the coordination motive and the symmetry of
information.
14See for example Bernanke (2007) for the recent evolution of the Fed’s communication of monetary
policy.
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behavior more than what would be justified by their informational contents. If public
announcements are inaccurate – because of inevitable forecast and perception errors –
private actions are drawn away from the fundamental value.15 Communicating with the
public is therefore a challenging task for a central bank as its disclosures, relayed by the
press, typically attract the full attention of financial markets.
From a theoretical point of view, we have shown that the central bank can control
the overreaction of agents by reducing either the degree of publicity or the degree of
transparency of its disclosure. Moreover, both communication strategies are equivalent in
terms of efficiency for reducing overreaction, as shown in Section 2.4. Our experimental
analysis is supportive of the theoretical prediction that both partial publicity and partial
transparency equivalently succeed in reducing overreaction to the public signal. Indeed,
H03-PP-PT states that the weight on the public signal observed in the experiment is not
significantly different in the PP- and in the PT-treatment (when the private signal is as
accurate as the public signal). Therefore our experiment does not allow us to formulate a
clear preference for one or the other disclosure strategy.
Other issues, which go beyond efficiency considerations, may also matter, however,
with regard to the choice of the disclosure strategy. In this section, we discuss the realism
and feasibility of disclosing information with a limited degree of publicity or transparency
and the discriminatory nature of disclosing information with partial publicity.
Implementation of partial publicity and partial transparency To what extent
can the central bank reduce overreaction by disclosing information with a limited degree
of publicity or transparency? In the real world, as in our theoretical and experimental
setup, the central bank can choose to release its information to a selected audience or to
release its information with ambiguity, such that its disclosure does not become common
knowledge among market participants.
Partial publicity can be achieved by disclosing information to specific groups through
media that reach only a part of all economic agents. There are several means by which
central banks release information. Most important are a central bank’s own publications
(hardcopies and Internet), press releases, press conferences, speeches and interviews, which
are aimed at as wide an audience as possible. For publications, since the release date is
announced beforehand , everybody has the chance of receiving the new information at the
same time. Speeches and interviews, on the other hand, are directed first of all at those
who are physically present, plus listeners if a speech is broadcasted. To reach a wider
audience and avoid misinterpretation, the texts of important speeches are also disclosed
and sometimes released via the Internet. However, speeches delivered in front of a small
group of market participants are less widely reported than formal announcements and
require more time to penetrate the whole community. Beliefs about the beliefs of other
15In this respect, Morris and Shin (2002) have shown that noisy public announcements may be detri-
mental to welfare and conclude that central banks should commit to withholding relevant information
or deliberately reduce its precision. This result has received a great deal of attention in the academic
literature, in the financial press (see for example The Economist (2004)), and among central banks.
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agents are less affected by these speeches than by formal publications at predetermined
dates.16 The use of various communication channels to reach various target groups was
advocated by Issing, former member of the board of the Deutsche Bundesbank and of
the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, according to whom, there is a ”need
to address various target groups, including academics, the markets, politicians, and the
general public. Such a broad spectrum may require a variety of communication channels
geared to different levels of complexity or different time horizons” (Issing, 2005, p. 72).
However, one may question whether limiting the degree of publicity regarding impor-
tant information is feasible in our information age, as media would quickly relay important
information and raise the degree of publicity above the primary proportion of informed
economic agents. Even if the central bank discloses information to a limited audience, this
information is likely to be relayed by the press on a large scale, particularly if it seems
important.
Partial transparency can be achieved by disclosing information to every market par-
ticipant but with some ambiguity. Is it possible for a central bank to achieve partial
transparency with ambiguous disclosure? Partial transparency was common practice as
central bankers were known for speaking with ambiguity. In 1987, the then chairman of
the Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan, took pride in being secretive: ”Since I’ve
become a central banker, I’ve learned to mumble with great incoherence. If I seem unduly
clear to you, you must have misunderstood what I said.” More recently, Meyer (2004), a
former member of the Board of Governors of the Fed, emphasized that the interpreta-
tion of a central banker’s speech can be extremely different from what the central banker
planned to say. In an interview by Fettig (1998), Meyer argues: ”the primary difficulty
is the variety of interpretations that are given to what you say, especially by the different
wire services. So, you try to be disciplined and communicate as effectively as you can, and
then you give a speech and get 10 varying interpretations of what you said, often with a lot
of liberties taken in the interpretation”. This statement suggests that full transparency is
more challenging to implement than partial transparency, and that ambiguity remains dif-
ficult to avoid completely. As soon as reducing overreaction to disclosure improves welfare
when the central bank is uncertain about the true economic conditions (which is the rule
rather than the exception), controlling the overreaction by means of partial transparency
seems easier to implement than partial publicity, as ambiguous interpretation naturally
emerges whenever information is disclosed.
Discrimination and fairness The second drawback associated with disclosing infor-
mation by means of partial publicity (and which makes a case in favor of partial trans-
16For a discussion, see Cornand and Heinemann (2008) and Walsh (2006). For the limited attention
attributed to speeches in comparison to written information Walsh (2006) argues (p. 230-231) that ”partial
announcements can occur when, for example, central bankers make speeches about the economy that may
not be as widely reported as formal announcements would be. Speeches and other means of providing partial
information play an important role in the practice of central bankers, and these means of communication
long predated publication of inflation reports. Speeches, like academic conferences, can be viewed as one
means of providing information to only a limited subset of the public.”.
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parency) rests on discriminatory issues. Disclosing information only to a limited audience
seems unfair and arbitrary. In democratic societies, central banks’ independence needs
to be underpinned by accountability and transparency. Hence, the central bank may find
it politically untenable to withhold important information from even parts of the public.
This may explain why central banks increasingly promote more publicity, as illustrated
by the first press conference in the history of the Fed, held in April 2011. As quoted in
the Financial Times (2011), Fed officials ’note the importance of fair and equal access by
the public to information’. This is one reason why, as of recently, the Fed holds regular
press conferences to better explain monetary policy to the public, as is already common
practice among many central banks.17 By contrast, providing the same information with
the same degree of ambiguity to the public as a whole does not create any discrimination.
In this respect, partial transparency can be preferable to partial publicity.
6 Conclusion
Central banks give much importance to their communication strategy because financial
markets are known for overreacting to public information. Since shaping market expecta-
tions plays a key role in the conduct of monetary policy, central banks often seek to exert
the maximal impact on market expectations with their public disclosures. However, they
may sometimes prefer to avoid overreaction to their disclosures either when disclosures are
uncertain or when disclosures contain information which creates economic inefficiencies.
Controlling the level of overreaction is therefore an important and challenging task for a
central bank.
The central bank can control the degree of overreaction by means of two different
communication strategies. First, the central bank can reduce overreaction with partial
publicity, that is by disclosing information to a subgroup of market participants only.
Second, the central bank can reduce overreaction with partial transparency, that is by
disclosing information to all market participants but with some ambiguity. We show that
both strategies are equivalent from a theoretical perspective in the sense that overreaction
can be controlled equivalently by means of partial publicity or partial transparency, and
that both communication strategies yield the same expected welfare. These theoretical
predictions are tested within a laboratory experiment, which confirms the effectiveness of
both communication strategies for reducing overreaction. Moreover, the equivalence of
both communication strategies cannot be rejected, as they both lead to the same degree
of common knowledge in the lab.
Although neither the theory nor the experiment allows the formulation of a clear
preference in favor of either communication strategy, this paper makes a case for partial
transparency rather than partial publicity, because the latter seems increasingly difficult to
17The announcement of regular press briefings of the Fed chairman is an additional step toward more
transparency at the Fed. A previous important step was taken in 1994, when the Fed started to commu-
nicate its interest rate decisions in a statement released at the end of the meetings of its Monetary Policy
Committee.
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implement in the information age and is associated with discrimination as well as fairness
issues.
A The experimental setup
This Appendix presents how the theoretical model in Section 2 is adjusted to an experi-
mental framework. The model is modified in two respects. First, the number of subjects
is finite and is written n (instead of a continuum of agents) and second, the distribution
of error terms is uniform (instead of normal).
The utility function for subject i is given by:
ui(ai, θ) ≡ −(1− r)(ai − θ)2 − r(ai − a−i)2, (17)
where θ is the fundamental, ai is the action taken by the subject i, and a−i is the average
action taken by the other subjects −i. Maximizing utility yields the optimal action of
subject i :
ai = (1− r)Ei(θ) + rEi(a−i).
A.1 Private and public signals (MS)
In the MS-treatment, subjects receive two signals that deviate from the fundamental θ by
some error terms with uniform distribution. All subjects receive the same public signal
y ∼ U [θ±η]. In addition, each subject receives a private signal xi ∼ U [θ± ]. Noise terms
xi − θ of distinct subjects and the noise y − θ of the public signal are independent and
their distribution is treated as exogenously given.
In equilibrium, the optimal average action over all subjects is given by
a¯ =
(1− r)η
+ (1− r)η︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−w
x¯+

+ (1− r)η︸ ︷︷ ︸
w
y. (18)
To compute the expected payoff in the experiment, we derive the corresponding ex-
pected utility (17) of subject i for the optimal behavior (18)
E
(
ui(ai, θ)
)
= E
(
− (1− r)
(
(1− w)(θ + ) + w(θ + η)− θ
)2
−r
(
(1− w)(θ + ) + w(θ + η)− (1− w)θ − w(θ + η)
)2)
= −(1− w)2Var()− (1− r)w2Var(η).
A.2 Partial publicity (PP)
In the PP-treatment, subjects may receive two kinds of signals that deviate from the
fundamental θ by some error terms with uniform distribution. Each subject receives a
private signal xi ∼ U [θ ± ]. A proportion P = p/n of subjects receives a semi-public
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(common) signal y ∼ U [θ ± η]. p/n is the degree of publicity. If the subject i gets the
public signal, (p−1)/(n−1) is the fraction of other players who also gets the public signal.
The optimal action of subjects who get only the private signal is
ai,−p = xi. (19)
The optimal action of subjects who get both the private and the semi-public signal is
ai,p = (1− w)xi + wy = (1− r)Ei(θ) + r
[n− p
n− 1Ei(θ) +
p− 1
n− 1((1− w)Ei(θ) + wy)
]
=
(1− r p−1n−1)η
+ (1− r p−1n−1)η︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−w
xi +

+ (1− r p−1n−1)η︸ ︷︷ ︸
w
y.
In equilibrium, the average action over all subjects is given by
a¯ =
(
1− p
n
)
x¯−p +
p
n
[
(1− r p−1n−1)ηx¯p + y
+ (1− r p−1n−1)η
]
=
n−p
n + (1− r p−1n−1)η
+ (1− r p−1n−1)η︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−w¯
x¯+
p
n
+ (1− r p−1n−1)η︸ ︷︷ ︸
w¯
y. (20)
To express the expected utility for subject i, we define w˜ = pn−1w and wˆ =
p−1
n−1w. The
expected utility of subject without public signal is given by (we assume that θ¯ = θ)
E
(
ui(ai, θ)
)
= E
(
− (1− r)
(
θ + − θ
)2 − r(θ + − (1− w˜)θ − w˜(θ + η))2)
= −Var()− rw˜2Var(η),
while the expected utility for subjects with public signal yields
E
(
ui(ai, θ)
)
= E
(
− (1− r)
(
(1− w)(θ + ) + w(θ + η)− θ
)2
−r
(
(1− w)(θ + ) + w(θ + η)− (1− wˆ)θ − wˆ(θ + η)
)2)
= −(1− w)2Var()− (1− r)w2Var(η)− r(w − wˆ)2Var(η).
Aggregating over all subjects, we get
E
(
ui(ai, θ)
)
= −
[n− p
n
+
p
n
(1− w)2
]
Var()
−
[n− p
n
rw˜2 +
p
n
(1− r)w2 + p
n
r(w − wˆ)2
]
Var(η).
A.3 Partial transparency (PT)
In the PT-treatment, subjects receive two signals that deviate from the fundamental θ
by some error terms with uniform distribution. Each subject receives a private signal
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xi ∼ U [θ± ] and a semi-public signal yi ∼ U [θ±η±φ], where yi is drawn for each subject
i individually from U [y ± φ] and where y ∼ U [θ ± η].
In equilibrium, the optimal average action over all subjects is given by
a¯ =
(1− r)η + φ
+ (1− r)η + φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−w
x¯+

+ (1− r)η + φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
w
y¯, (21)
and the expected utility yields
E
(
ui(ai, θ)
)
= E
(
− (1− r)
(
(1− w)(θ + ) + w(θ + η + φ)− θ
)2
−r
(
(1− w)(θ + ) + w(θ + η + φ)− (1− w)θ − w(θ + η)
)2)
= −(1− w)2Var()− w2Var(φ)− (1− r)w2Var(η).
A.4 Equivalence between partial publicity and partial transparency
As expressed in Section 2.4, we can show that both the PP- and PT-treatments are
equivalent for reducing overreaction to the public signal. The equivalence relationship
between the degree of publicity p/n and the degree of transparency φ is obtained by
equalling the optimal average weight w¯ on the public signal in the PP-treatment (20) with
the optimal average weight w on the public signal in the PT-treatment (21):
p
n
+ (1− r p−1n−1)η
=

+ (1− r)η + φ,
which implies
p
n
=
(n− 1)(+ η) + rη
(n− 1)(+ η + φ) + rη or
φ =
n− p
p
(
+ η +
rη
n− 1
)
.
B Limited level of reasoning
This appendix presents the derivation of weights put on the public signal in actions cor-
responding to limited levels of reasoning about decisions of others for the version of the
model set in appendix A.
We define level-1 players as players who ignore the strategic part of the payoff function
so that a1i = Ei(θ).18 This also corresponds to the level-1 in Cornand and Heinemann
(2010). The weight on the public signal for agents with limited levels of reasoning depends
on the considered treatment as well as parameter values. In this appendix, we derive level-1
and levels of higher order for the MS-, PP- and PT-treatments respectively.
18Nagel (1995) and Stahl and Wilson (1994) define level-0 types as subjects who choose an action
randomly from a uniform distribution over all possible actions. For k > 0, a level-k type is playing best
response to level-k − 1. The best response to a uniform distribution over all reals is a1i = Ei(θ).
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B.1 Private and public signal (MS)
Starting from the definition of level-1, actions for higher levels of reasoning in the MS-
treatment can be calculated as follows.
Suppose that the players −i (all players except player i) attach weight ρk to the public
signal. The best response of player i to such behavior is:
ak+1i = (1− r)Ei(θ) + rEi(a−i)
= (1− r)Ei(θ) + r(1− ρk)Ei(x−i) + rρky.
Since the expected private signal of the other player equals the expected state,
ak+1i = [(1− rρk)]Ei(θ) + rρky
=
(1− rρk)η
+ η
xi +
[
(1− rρk)
+ η
+ rρk
]
y.
Hence the weight on the public signal for the next level of reasoning is:
ρk+1 =
+ rηρk
+ η
.
With the experimental parameters of groups 1 to 12, we get the following weights for
the level of reasoning k: ρ1 = 0.5, ρ2 = 0.7125, ρ3 = 0.8028, ρ4 = 0.8412, ρ5 = 0.8575,
and ρ∞ = 0.8696. With the experimental parameters of groups 13 to 18, we get: ρ1 = 0.4,
ρ2 = 0.6040, ρ3 = 0.7080, ρ4 = 0.7611, ρ5 = 0.7882, and ρ∞ = 0.8163.
B.2 Partial publicity (PP)
Starting from the definition of level-1, actions for higher levels of reasoning in the PP-
treatment can be calculated as follows.
For subjects who only receive the private signal, they have no choice but playing
ai,−p = xi.
For sujects who receive both signals, we proceed as in B.1 and suppose that the players
−i (all players except player i) attach weight ρk to the public signal. The best response
of player i to such behavior is:
ak+1i,p = (1− ρk+1)xi + ρk+1y = (1− r)Ei(θ) + r
[n− p
n− 1Ei(θ) +
p− 1
n− 1((1− ρk)Ei(θ) + ρky)
]
=
(n− 1− (p− 1)ρ)η
(n− 1)(+ η)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−ρk+1
xi +
(n− 1)+ (p− 1)rηρk
(n− 1)(+ η)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρk+1
y.
Hence the weight on the public signal for the next level of reasoning is:
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ρk+1 =
(n− 1)+ (p− 1)rηρk
(n− 1)(+ η) .
Averaging over all agents:
a¯k+1i,p = (1− ρ¯k+1)xi + ρ¯k+1y
= 1−
p
(
(n− 1)+ (p− 1)rηρk
)
n(n− 1)(+ η)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−ρ¯k+1
xi +
p
(
(n− 1)+ (p− 1)rηρk
)
n(n− 1)(+ η)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρ¯k+1
y.
With the experimental parameters of groups 1 to 12, we get the following weights for the
level of reasoning k: ρ1 = 0.3571, ρ2 = 0.4583, ρ3 = 0.4870, ρ4 = 0.4951, ρ5 = 0.4974, and
ρ∞ = 0.4983. With the experimental parameters of groups 13 to 18, we get: ρ1 = 0.2857,
ρ2 = 0.3829, ρ3 = 0.4159, ρ4 = 0.4271, ρ5 = 0.4309, and ρ∞ = 0.4329.
B.3 Partial transparency (PT)
Proceeding as earlier,
ak+1i = (1− r)Ei(θ) + rEi(a−i)
= (1− r)Ei(θ) + r(1− ρk)Ei(x−i) + rρky.
Since the expected private signal of the other player equals the expected state,
ak+1i = [(1− rρk)]Ei(θ) + rρky
=
(1− rρk)(η + φ)
+ η + φ
xi +
[
(1− rρk)
+ η + φ
+ rρk
]
y.
Hence the weight on the public signal for the next level of reasoning is:
ρk+1 =
+ rηρk
+ η + φ
.
With the experimental parameters of groups 1 to 12, we get the following weights for
the level of reasoning k: ρ1 = 0.3509, ρ2 = 0.4555, ρ3 = 0.4867, ρ4 = 0.4960, ρ5 = 0.4988,
and ρ∞ = 0.5. With the experimental parameters of groups 13 to 18, we get: ρ1 = 0.2778,
ρ2 = 0.3762, ρ3 = 0.4110, ρ4 = 0.4233, ρ5 = 0.4277, and ρ∞ = 0.4301.
C Instructions
Instructions to participants varied according to the treatments. We present the instruc-
tions for a treatment with order of stages: 1, 2 and 3 (and parameter values: r = 0.85,
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ε = 10, η = 10, φ = 0, p = 7). For the other treatments, instructions were adapted
accordingly and are available upon request.19
Instructions
General information
Thank you for participating in an experiment in which you can earn money. These
earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
We ask you not to communicate from now on. If you have a question, then raise your
hand and the instructor will come to you.
You are a group of 14 persons in total participating in this experiment and you are
allocated into two groups of 7 persons. These two groups are totally independent and do
not interact one with another during the whole length of the experiment. Each participant
interacts only with other participants in his group and not with the participants of the
other group. The current instructions describe the rules of the game for a group of 7
participants.
The rules are the same for all the participants. The experiment consists of 3 stages,
each including 15 periods. At each of the 15 periods, you are asked to make a decision.
Your payoff depends on the decisions you make all along the experiment. The stages differ
from one another by the hints (indicative values) that will be given to you to make your
decisions.
Section A describes how your payoff is calculated at each stage. Sections B, C and D
describe the indicative values you have at stages 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
A - Rule that determines your payoff at each of the 45 periods (3 stages of
15 periods)
Z is an unknown positive number. This unknown positive number is different at each
period but identical for all the participants (of the same group).
At each period, you are asked to make a decision by choosing a number. Your payoff in
ECU (Experimental Currency Unit) associated with your decision is given by the following
formula:
400− 1, 5(your decision− Z)2 − 8, 5(your decision− the average decision of the others)2.
This formula indicates that your payoff gets higher the closer you decision to
• on the one hand the unknown number Z and
• on the other hand the average decision of the other participants.
To maximize your payoff you have to make a decision that is as close as possible to the
unknown number Z and to the decision of the other participants. Note however that it is
more important to be close to the average decision of the other participants than to the
unknown number Z. No participant knows the true value of Z when making his decision.
19What follows is a translation (from French to English) of the instructions given to the participants.
32
However, each participant receives some hints on the unknown number Z as explained in
sections B, C and D.
B - Your hints on Z during stage 1 (15 periods)
At each period of the first stage, you receive two hints (numbers) on the unknown
number Z to make your decision. These hints contain unknown errors.
• Private hint X Each participant receives at each period a private hint X on the
unknown number Z.The private hints are selected randomly over the error interval
[Z − 10, Z + 10]. All the numbers of this interval have the same probability to be
drawn. Your private hint and the private hint of any of the other participants are
selected independently from one another over the same interval, so that in general
each participant receives a private hint that is different from that of the
other participants.
• Common hint Y On top of this private hint X, you, as well as the other members
of your group, receive at each period, a common hint Y on the unknown number Z.
This common hint is also randomly selected over the interval [Z − 10, Z + 10]. All
the numbers of this interval have the same probability to be selected. This common
hint Y is the same for all participants.
Example:
0
Z
X6 X3 X2 X1X5 X7X4
0 Y
Private hint 
(private to each 
participant)
Common hint 
(common to all 
participants)
Error interval
Z-10 Z+10
Distinction between private hint X and common hint Y
Note that your private hint X and the common hint Y have the same precision: each is
drawn from the same error interval. The sole distinction between the two hints is that each
participant observes a private hint X that is different from that of the other participants
whereas all the participants observe the same common hint Y.
How to make a decision? As you do not know the errors associated with your hints,
it is natural to choose, as a decision, a number that is between your private hint X and
the common hint Y. To make your decision, you are asked to select, owing to a cursor, a
number that is between your private hint X and the common hint Y. You thus have to
choose how to combine your two hints in order to maximize your payoff.
Once you have set the cursor on the decision of your choice, click on the ’Validate’
button. Once all the participants have done the same, a period ends and you are told
about the result of the period. Then a new period starts.
As soon as the 15 periods of the first stage are over, the second stage of the experiment
starts.
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C - Your hints on Z during stage 2 (15 periods)
The second stage is different from the first in that some participants do not observe
the common hint. You get either one or two hints on Z to make your decision.
• Private hint X In accordance with stage 1, each participant receives at each period
a private hint X on the unknown number Z. The private hints are selected randomly
over the error interval [Z − 10, Z + 10]. All the numbers of this interval have the
same probability to be selected. Your private hint and the private hint of each other
participant are selected independently from one another over the same interval, so
that in general each participant receives a private hint that is different from
that of the other participants.
• Semi-common hint Y’ On top of this private hint X, 5 out of the 7 participants
of your group, randomly selected at each period, receive a so-called semi-common
hint Y’ on the unknown number Z. This semi-common hint is also randomly selected
on the interval [Z − 10, Z + 10]. All the numbers of this interval have the same
probability to be selected. This hint is semi-common in that only 5 out of the 7
participants of your group receive this common hint. This semi-common hint Y’ is
the same for the 5 participants who receive it. The 2 remaining participants
do not observe this semi-common hint and simply get their private hint.
Example:
0
Z
X6 X3 X2 X1X5 X7X4
0
Private hint 
(private to each 
participant)
Semi-common hint 
(semi-common to 
5 out of 7 
participants)
Error interval
Z-10 Z+10
'Y
How to make your decision?
To make your decision, you are asked to select, owing to a cursor, a number that is
between your private hint X and the semi-common hint Y’ as long as you are among the
participants who observe the semi-common hint Y’. The participants who only receive a
private hint X have no choice but to make a decision equal to their private hint.
Once you have set the cursor on the decision of your choice, click on the ’Validate’
button. Once all the participants have done the same, a period ends and you are told
about the result of the period. Then a new period starts.
As soon as the 15 periods of the second stage are over, the third stage of the experiment
starts.
D - Your hints on Z during stage 3 (15 periods)
At each period of the third stage, you receive two hints on Z to make your decision.
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• Private hint X In accordance with stages 1 and 2, each participant receives at each
period a private hint X on the unknown number Z. The private hints are selected
randomly over the error interval [Z − 10, Z + 10]. All the numbers of this interval
have the same probability to be selected. Your private hint and the private hint of
each other participant are selected independently from one another over the same
interval, so that in general each participant receives a private hint that is
different from that of the other participants.
• Semi-common hint Y” On top of this private hint X, each participant receives a
semi-common hint Y” on the unknown number Z. This semi-common hint contains
two errors, one that is commin and one that is private.
– First, as in the first stage, a common hint Y is selected randomly over the
interval [Z − 10, Z + 10]. The hint Y (and the error it contains) is common to
all participants (it is the same for all the participants). However, you do not
observe this hint Y directly.
– Instead, you observe the common hint Y to which a private error is added, this
error being selected randomly over the interval [−8,+8]. The semi-common hint
Y” that you observe is thus randomly selected over the interval [Y − 8, Y + 8].
Your private error and the private error of any of the other participants are
selected independently from one another over the same interval, so that in
general each participant receives a semi-common hint Y” that is different from
that of the other participants.
Example:
0
Z
X6 X3 X2 X1X5 X7X4
0
Y
Private hint 
(private to each 
participant)
Error interval 1
0
Semi-common 
hint (semi-
common to each 
participant)
Error interval 2
Z-10 Z+10
Y-8.5 Y+8.5
''
1Y
''
6Y
''
4Y
''
3Y
''
5Y
''
7Y
''
2Y
Distinction between private hint X and common hint Y”
Your private hint X and the semi-common hint Y” can be distinguished in two ways.
First, the private hint X is more precise than the semi-common hint Y”. The error interval
of the private hint X is [Z − 10, Z + 10] while the error interval of the semi-common hint
Y” is [Z − 18.5, Z + 18.5]. Indeed, the semi-common hint Y” contains on the one hand
an error that is common to all the participants [Z − 10, Z + 10] and on the other hand a
private error that is different for every participant [Y − 8.5, Y + 8.5]. Second, while the
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error in the private hint X is different for each participant, the semi-common hint Y”
contains an error that is common to all the participants.
How to make a decision? To make a decision, you are asked to selected, owing to
a cursor, a number that is between your private hint X and the semi-common hint Y”.
Once you have set the cursor on the decision of your choice, click on the ’Validate’
button. Once all the participants have done the same, a period ends and you are told
about the result of the period. Then a new period starts.
As soon as the 15 periods of the third stage are over, the experiment ends.
You will be told about each change in stage.
Questionnaires:
At the beginning of the experiment, you are asked to fill in an understanding ques-
tionnaire on the computer; when all the participants have responded properly to this
questionnaire, the experiment starts. At the end of the experiment, you are asked to fill
on a personal questionnaire on the computer. All information will remain secret.
Payoffs: At the end of the experiment, the ECUs you have obtained are converted
into Euros and paid in cash. 1000 ECUs correspond to 2 Euros.
If you have any question, please ask them at this time.
Thanks for participating in the experiment!
D Training questionnaire
The training questionnaire varied according to the treatments.20 We present the ques-
tionnaire for a treatment with order of stages: 1, 2 and 3 (and parameter values: r=0.85,
=10, =10, =0, p=7). For the other treatments, the training questionnaires were adapted
accordingly and are available upon request.21 Each of the 10 following questions had to
be answered by right or wrong, yes or no or multiple choices.
Question 1: ”During each period of the 3 stages of the experiment, you always interact
with the same participants.” Answer: ”True” (Explanation message: ”It is true. You
always interact with the same participants during the whole length of the experiment.”)
Question 2: ”At each period of the 3 stages, all the participants of the same group
receive the same private hint X.” Answer: ”Wrong” (Explanation message: ”It is wrong.
In general, the participants receive different private hints X.”)
Question 3: ”At each period of stage 1, all the participants of the same group receive
the same common hint Y.” Answer: ”True” (Explanation message: ”It is true. At each
period of stage 1, all the participants of the same group receive the same common hint
Y.”)
Question 4: ”Is it natural to make a decision outside the interval defined by your two
hints?” Answer: ”No” (Explanation message: ”Indeed, as, in average, the errors of the
two hints are zero (distributed over -10,+10), it is natural to combine these two hints to
20Questions 6, 8, 9 and 10 had to be adapted to the treatment.
21What follows is a translation (from French to English) of the training questionnaire given to the
participants.
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make your decision. Therefore the cursor will allow you only to make decisions inside the
interval defined by your two hints. Note however that it is possible that the true value of
Z is outside this interval.”)
Question 5: ”To maximize your payoff, it is more important that your decision be
close to the unknown number Z than to the decision of the others.” Answer: ”Wrong”
(Explanation message: ”Indeed, your payoff depends more on the distance between your
decision and the average decision of the others than on the distance between your decision
and the unknown number Z. ”)
Question 6: ”Suppose the true value of Z is equal to 143 and the average decision
of the other participants of the group is equal to 133. What is your payoff in ECUs if
your decision is equal to 138?” Answer: 150 (Explanation message: ”Indeed, the payoff
associated to your decision is equal to 150 (=400-1.5(138-143)2-8.5(138-133)2).”)
Question 7: ”Generally, at stage 1, the private hint X is as informative on the average
decision of the others as the common hint Y.” Answer: ”Wrong” (Explanation message:
”It is wrong. While the private hint X is as precise as the common hint Y on the number
Z, the common hint Y is generally more informative on the average decision of the others
because all the participants observe it.”)
Question 8: ”The difference between stages 1 and 2 is that the common hint Y is
observed by all the participants at stage 1 while it is observed only by 5 out of the 7
participants at stage 2.” Answer: ”True” (Explanation message: ”It is true.”)
Question 9: ”The difference between stages 1 and 3 is that the same common hint Y
is observed by all the participants at stage 1 while at stage 3 each participant observes a
different semi-common hint Y”.” Answer: ”True” (Explanation message: ”It is true.”)
Question 10: ”At all stages of the experiment, the private hint X is as precise as
the (semi-)common hint Y (Y’, Y”) on the number Z.” Answer: ”Wrong” (Explanation
message: ”It is wrong. At stages 1 and 2, the private hint X is equally precise as the
(semi-)common hint Y (Y’) on the number Z. However, at stage 3, the private hint X is
more precise on the number Z than the semi-common hint Y”.”)
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